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By Tanya Kateri Hernandez
a1cial integrto has long been the
touchstone of racial progress in the
0 workplace. But integration is only the
beginning of the struggle to end racial discrimination. As workplaces become more
diverse, they do nor necessarily becomie less
racially discriminatory. Diverse workplaces
may be characterized by antagonism
between people ofdifferent races. Interethnic
discrimination may exist along side the discrimination that has traditionally occurred
between blacks and whites, i.e., non-white
racial and ethnic groups may engage in disparate-treatment employment discrimination actionable under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.' Examples of interethnic
discrimination occur among members of
different ethnic subgroups, as when Puerto
Ricans allegedly discriminate against
Mexican-Americans or Dominicans, or
white Latinos allegedly discriminate against
Afro-Latinos. In reality, then, there are
many ways that non-white ethnic groups
and subgroups can be complicit in racebased decision making in the workplace.
In the emerging interethnic discrimination cases, workplace diversity has been
viewed as something of a safe harbor from
charges of discrimination. This view exists
despite established Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. Early in the history
of Title VII, the Supreme Court rejected
the premise that no question of bias could
be present if a workplace has many mem2
bers from a plaintiff's protected grouIp.
Yet, when the context is contemporary
interethnic discrimination, the emerging
cases suggest that some courts are so viscerally impressed by the vision of a presumably diverse workplace that they miss the
applicability of this precedent and instead
construct what I term a makeshift "diversity defense" to discrimination.
The diversity defense describes the

equivalent of racially harmonious ones.
This equivalence effectively treats all
people of color as the same and overlooks the histories of racial animus within and across different ethnic groups.
The judicial fashioning of a diversity
defense to employment discrimination
appears to reflect wishful thinking that
diversity is a panacea for racial conflict.'

90 percent of the approximately 10 nmillion enslaved Africans brought to the
Americas were taken to Latin America
and the Caribbean, whereas only 4.6 percent were brought to the United States.
In Latin America and the Caribbean,
as in the United States, lighter skin and
European features can increase one's
chances for socioeconomic advancement,

Unfortunately, diversity alone cannot
eradicate racial discriminaition.
The majority of interethnic employoment discrimination claims that are starting to appear are those in which Latinos
are involved as victims or as agents of
individual disparate treatment discrimination in the workplace. Accordingly, it
is important to note that racisma, and in
particular anti-black racism, is a pervasive
and historically entrenched fact of life in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Over

while darker skin and African or indigenous features may limit opportunities
for social mobility.4 Attitudes of bias are
also well established within the Latino
community. Sociological studies of Latino
racial attitudes often reflect a preference
on the part of Latinos for maintaining
social distance from African Americans.
And wvhile the social distance level is largest for recent Latin-American immigrants,
more established communities of Latinos
in the United States are also character-
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ized by their social distance from African
Americans.'
Consider a paradigmatic case that
deimoistrates the analytical problems
surfacing in the emerging interethnic
discrimination cases. A self-identified
Afro-Panamanian tutor of Spanish sued
his university employer for failure to
renew his appointment as an adjunct
instructor, claimingy a violation of Title
VII's prohibition against race and national origin discrimination. The plaintiff
alleged that the Latinos who directed
the department where he worked discriminated against "Black Hispanics,"
and that there was a disturbing culture
of favoritism in promoting white Cubans,
Spaniards, and white Hispanics from
South America. The court. not understanding that a color hierarchy informs
the ways in which many Latinos experience the racism and national origin bias
of othler Latinos, dismissed his racial
discrimination claim on summary judgmenit.6 The national origin claim was also
dismiissed on summary judgment, because
five of the eight adjunct instructors that
were reappointed instead of the plaintiff
were natives of other South or Central
American countries such as Argentina,
Peru, Mexico, and the Dominican
Republic. The surviving discrimination
claim that went before the jury, which
was based on color, was weakened by the
absence of information as to how color
bias may be a manifestation of racism in
Latino cultures, and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant. The

judge explicitly stated int the opinion that
"Diversity in an employer'sstaff undercuts
an inference of discrim1tina to(ry intent."
This decision embodies a number of
serious legal and factual errors. To begin
with, the notion that dive rsity in the workplace disproves bias ruins entirely counter
to a significant line of' Supreme Court
decisions explaining the pr-oper use, and
nonuse, of statistical iniformnation about
diversity. The rules of statistical inference
and its evidentiary use were incorporated
into the jurisprudence of employment discrimination under Castaveda v. Partida.1
In its decision there, the Supreme Court
explained that statistically significant
measures showing a lack of workplace
diversity may constitute evidence of discrimination.' But that doesn't work in
reverse: the presence of statistical diversity in the workplace (mnore precisely, the
absence of statistical evidence of a lack
of diversity) cannot be equated with the
absence of discrimination itself. This is
so because, as the Supreme Court noted
in Teamsters v. United States,' population
statistics have been traditionally considered relevant to Title VII cases only in the
context of statistically significant, gross
underrepresentations of racial minorities,
since our racial history has shown that, in
the absence of any other explanation, it is
more likely than nor that racial discrimination accounts for the underrepresentation.
Indeed, workforce statistics were first
approved for use in individual disparate
treatment cases only insofar as they "may
be helpful to a determination of whether
petitioner's refusal to hire respondent
conformed to a general pattern of discrimination." 10 There was no suggestion that
workforce statistics could have an exculpatory use. Moreover, in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.," the Court rejected the

the equivalent of treating immiigrants from
Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africai as racially
homogYeneous. As in Africa, thec con-tinent
of Latin America contains va,,st differences in racial composition and biais. Those
countries perceived or touted as European
are v:iewed as more adIvanced than those
more significantly populated with people
of indigyenous or African descenr. Thus, in
the list of countries the judg(.e imentioned in
finding an absence of national origin bias,
Latin American racial constructs would
rank Argentina as a highly v'alued white
country. followed by Peru, then Mexico with
its indigyenous population. Leaist respected
would be the Dominican Republic and the
plaintiffs own country of origin, Panama,
because of their dominance by Africandescended peoples.
For Latinos influenced by Latin
American racial paradigms where each
country has a racial identification, a diverse
workforce of Latinos is not the immediate
equivalent of a bias-free context. Nor is
a color preference divorced from a racializdielgy within the Latino context. 2
Diversity mecans something more nuanced
to people of color, who tend not to view
each ethnic group as the same as another
simply because it is non-white. Yet the
public discourse about diversity as a panacea for racial discrimination overlooks the
complexity of actual diversity. In a diverse
workplace there is the possibility for racial
harmony, but there is also the possibility for
a racial dystopia. What the emerging cases
suggest is that, unlike with traditional blackwhite employment discrimination cases,
interethnic discrimination cases require a
broader inquiry, one that will reveal how
bias is manifested in multiethnic conitexts.
Demogc)raphers project that one in
four job seekers will1 be the child of a
Latinio immiigrant by the year 2020 and
that- Tiowreswlvatyicae

Tay dKtr Hrn de is professor
of law, Fordham University School of Law,
and 2010-2011 visiting research scholar,
Princeton University Program in Law and
Public Affairs. She may be reached at
ProfessorTKH@gmail.com.
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skinned Pakistani citizen from the provthe workplace, presents major challenges
ince of Punjab employed at the National
to the employment discrimination regime
Bank of Pakistan's New York branch
under Title VII. One of these challenges
lies in the collection and presentation uf alleged that the bank discriminated
information about the existence of bias against him in favor of darker-skinned
Pakistani citizens from the province of
within Latino subgroups.
Sind. In dismissing the plaintiffs claim,
A fuller record of interethnic racial
the court noted that, while a number of
animus is needed to add nuance to the
light-skinned employees predominated in
jurisprudence of antidiscrimination so
the less highly paid job positions, it was
that the multiethnic workplace becomes
problematic that
less opaque to
no "evidence by
and
fact-finders
way of expert teslegal actors can
timonv or treatise
identify the new
was presented with
markers of racial
discrimination. 13
respect to color differences among the
The Multiracial
various provinces
1
Racism Litigation
of Pakistan, or disApproach (MRLA)
crimination based
proposed here is
on color." The
mechanism
one
court was disturbed
for doing so. Given
by the lack of a fulltraditional
the
er record because
presumption that
unclear
it was
racial discriminawhether a lighttion only exists
skinned Pakistani
when a whitewho "is darker in
Anglo person is
complexion than
present as an instithose commonly
gator or victim, this
termed white in
proposed approach
the United States"
require
would
(prowarrants
plaintiffs to provide
more detailed pleadings in the vein of a itected class status" under the McDonnell
"Brandeis brief," i.e., one in which eco- Douglas prima facie evidentiary standards.
nomic and sociat surveys and studies are The court explicitly stated:
included along with explications of the
Suffice it to note that the presumplaw. Expert witnesses on the subject of
tion of a protected class status on the
brought
to
be
will
need
bias
interethnic
basis of color is bound up with an
be
more
to
will
need
in and depositions
entire national racial history. It may
fully
By
more
expansive in approach.
well be that there are indigenous
will
fact-finders
developing the record,
discriminatory practices around the
veil
of
the
be better able to see beyond
world having nothing to do with
racial
a diverse workplace as a presumed
the American experience. However,
reinthus,
utopia. This approach will,
there is no basis on this record for
employforce for courts how established
the recognition of skin color as a
may
b
ment discrimination doctrines
presumptive discriminatory criterion
applicable to the context of interethnic
(rooted one wvould suppose, in the
discrimination.
intermingling of dfistinctive iiational
One court has already anticipated the
or racial grouips) in employment in
need for a fuller record wvith social science
Pak-istan, or amongc Pakistanis in
data and expert witnesses in interethnic
New York, under lMcDonnell Douglas
discrimination cases. In All v. NationaCI4
guidelines.
B3ank of Pakistan,'1 a self-des;cribed lighI-t.

c

r

In short, the judge is asserting that
when Title VII cases implicate ra.,cial
meanings beyond what is commonly
expected in the U.S. setting, a fuller record
about those meanings must be established
in order for the existing legal doctrine to
be applied effectively. And that is exaictly
why the MRLA proposed herein shoutd
be more systematically applied.
The goal of the MRLA is to contextualize allegations of interethnic discrimination by (1) establishing the premise that
interethnic hierarchy and bias may exist,
(2) focusing the inquiry on whether there
were racially advantaged and disadvantaged
employees among the diverse non-white
workers, (3) providing the social science
data about the relevant racial attitudes,
and (4) demonstrating the applicability
of established employment discrimination
doctrine to diverse workplaces.
judges customarily admit empirical
information through the use of expert
witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. judges have accepted the
presentation of expert testimony on the
deployment of racial stereotypes in the
workplace in order to disabuse fact-finders
of what they believe is "common sense."15
In Walker v. State, a law professor provided expert testimony on behalf of an
African-American state trooper alleging
discriminatory discharge.' 6 The testimony, based on research in the literature of
racial stereotyping, explained how the
content of the performance evaluations
was rooted in racial stereotyping. Expert
testimony in interethnic discrimination
cases would be especially useful in delineating how various populations of color
racialize themselves by subgyrou)p and
other grouips as -well.
In cases where litigants do not proffer
the emnpirical evidence themselves, a grow-
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bar this third use of social science in law,
thereby allowing a court to admit empirical information "to kecep it responsive to its
changing environment."1 1
Fortunately, the admission of empirical
evidence to create a social framework is not
contravened by the trial court gatekeeper
role envisioned in Daubert v. Meirelt Dow
19
Pharamaceuticals
and its subsequent
is
This
cases.
because the proffered
empirical
evidence is sci entifically valid,
as indicated by
(1) its publication
in peer-reviewed
joumnals, (2) its
general acceptance
within the scholarly
disciplines of sociology and political science, and
(3) its relevance
employment
to
discrimination
case issues of cultural stereotyping.
Furthermore, the
requires
MRLA
no modification of
existing legal standards for proving individual disparate treatment discrimination.
This is because apparent workplace diversity does not alter any of the preexisting
legal standards for proving discrimination
as articulated in McDonnell v. Douglas
and its progeny.20 As the Supreme Court
has stated, "a racially balanced work force
cannot immunize an employer from liabil21
ity for specific acts of discrimination."
The MRLA would simply provide needed
context for the standard Title VII proof
in diverse workplaces. Plaintiffs must still
show how the alleged facts amount to
discrimination but will do so by focus22
ing on cultural and historical context.
Defendants will still have the same
opportunity for rebuttal by proffering a
-nondiscriminatoty reason for the challenged employment decision, in addition
to providing expert witnesses of their own
regarding the relevant cultural and histori-

at

q

cal context presented by the plaintiff.
Retumning then to the paradigmatic
Latino interethnic discrimination case,
the plaintiff needed to explicitly present
the documentation of how racial privilege
and bias generally exist in non-white
contexts. With that background empirical information, the plainitiff would then
h ave been more
likely to persuade
the court to consider the empirical
data about Latino
attitudes
racial
and their manifestation. The plaintiffs submission of
expert testimony
regarding the long
legacy of antiblack bias against
A f ro - La t ino s
within Latin
America would
have
dispelled
inclination
the
to view Latinos
as homogeneous
and interchangeable. In turn, the
disruption of the
of
presumption
Latino homogeneity would have eliminated the rationalization that "diversity in
an employer's staff undercuts an inference
of discriminatory intent." And established
employment discrimination doctrine
would not have been overlooked.
In conclusion, because of the long
legacy of black-white racism in the United
States, discussion of race has rightfully
focused on the black-white paradigm of
U.S. race relations and its effects on civil
rights enforcement. Bu-t the changing
demographics of the United States means
that we need to expand the analysis of
racism to include considerations of how
groups of color can be complicit and
even active agents in the discrimination
against other groups of color. By supplying judges with the empirical information
they need to better apprehend that racial
bias can exist even within multiracial
workplace settings, we can acti-vely Work

r iu, ira

r

V
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to appropriately enforce our nation's civil
rights laws within diverse workplaces.
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